Introduction
Default risk and the risk of default of sovereigns and banking institutions more specifically, has proved to be of major concern for regulators during the subprime and the current sovereign debt crises. As the European Central Bank sets the focus of systemic risk management on the macrofinancial level (ECB, 2009), one could conveniently observe the financial system as a portfolio of its constituents, as stressed by Lehar (2005) This paper outlines a comprehensive procedure for joint default risk assessment and introduces a series of systemic risk measures that should enhance the regulators' toolkit for analyzing financial system's distress. The procedure we propose can be divided in three steps. First, we use CDS spreads to extract the perceived individual default risk of 10 euro area (EA) sovereigns and 15 EA large and complex banking institutions (LCBGs). The second step consists of estimating the multivariate probability densities of the EA banking and sovereign systems. Among the various procedures discussed in the literature, the method that we consider especially appropriate for our purposes is the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimization (CIMDO) procedure (Segoviano, 2006; Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009 ).
This methodology has solid conceptual underpinnings, allowing us to focus on the market beliefs of the performance of an institution or a sovereign, while avoiding a direct examination of their capital structure. After recovering the system's mul-tivariate probability density, we proceed to our final stage -deriving a series of systemic risk indicators that analyze the fragility of the financial system to default events.
It is important to note that by using CDS-derived default probabilities, we are concentrating on market default risk perceptions and not directly on actual default frequencies. Market perceptions about individual and joint default risk are of interest to investors and regulators, because default risk premia comprise a large part of bond yields. Since nowadays banks and sovereigns rely heavily on international financial markets to finance their liquidity needs, they should pay closer attention to market default expectations. This is especially important for regulators in their analysis of the effectiveness of policy measures.
The reason why we investigate euro area sovereign default parallel to banking default is straightforward. At the wake of the sovereign debt crisis EA banks had This paper is part of a broader research agenda with the main purpose to shed more light on the EA financial system distress vulnerability during the recent crises.
In Gorea and Radev (2014) , we investigate the determinants of perceived bivariate joint default risk of euro area countries and find that investors seem to discriminate between the EA "core" (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands) and "periphery" (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) already during the PostLehman global recession. In Radev (2013), we introduce a new multivariate measure for default risk contributions, the change in conditional joint default probability (∆CoJP oD), and use it to analyze the susceptibility of the EA banking system to sovereign default. We find evidence for "too-big-to-save", riskiness-of-business and asset quality considerations in the investors' assessment of the EA banking system vulnerability to sovereign risk. The current work complements our previous studies and extends the regulatory toolbox of probability measures introduced by and Zhang et al. (2012) . We believe that our study would help policy makers and regulators to get a more comprehensive perspective of the EA systemic risk vulnerabilities in the current turbulent times.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology for deriving marginal and joint probabilities of default. In section 3, we introduce our probability measures and provide guidelines for their calculation. Section 4 describes briefly our dataset, while section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Methodology
The first step of our procedure involves estimating expected probabilities of default (PoD) of sovereigns and banks. To this end, we use 1-to 5-year government and bank CDS premia and apply a procedure called CDS bootstrapping, based on Hull and White (2000) . This method for PoD estimation is used by Gorea and Radev (2014) and Radev (2013) 1 and the interested reader can consult with these sources for more information.
As a second step, we transfer univariate to multivariate probabilities of default, using the CIMDO approach of Segoviano (2006) . 2 Let the financial system is represented by a portfolio of n entities (sovereigns or banks): X 1 , X 2 to X n , with their log-assets being x 1 , x 2 , to x n . The CIMDO approach then minimizes the following Lagrangian:
The first integral in equation 1 represents the cross-entropy probability difference, introduced in Kullback (1959) . The idea of this approach is to minimize the distance between a prior distribution guess q(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) ∈ R n and a posterior distribution p(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) ∈ R n that reflects empirical market data on individual probabilities of default. The market information is included in the model by means of consistency 1 Radev (2013) shows that this method achieves a more accurate mapping from CDS spreads to probabilities of default than a widely used simplified formula. 2 The current section outlines the multivariate case of the CIMDO approach, following Radev (2013) . For lower dimensionality problems, see Segoviano (2006) and Gorea and Radev (2014) .
constraints (the lines from the second to the last but one in equation 1). In those constraints, P oD 1 t , P oD 2 t to P oD n t stand for the expected probabilities of default of the respective entities, derived from CDS prices. With
we denote a set of indicator functions that take the value of one if the respective entities' default thresholds x 1 , x 2 to x n are crossed and zero in the opposite case.
The empirical default thresholds are analogous to the ones in the classic structural model (Merton, 1974) and are calculating by inverting a standard normal cumulative distribution at the borrower's average estimated PoD for the sample period. To constrain the posterior distribution to the [0, 1] n region, we need to impose the additivity rule in the last line of equation 1. The coefficients µ, λ 1 , λ 2 to λ n are the Lagrange multipliers of the described constraints. The optimal CIMDO (or posterior) distribution is then represented in the following way:
In the next section, we explain how the optimal CIMDO distribution from equation 2 can be used to derive a series of unconditional and conditional probability measures.
Probability Measures
Once we have specified the default regions of the prior distribution and recovered the optimal Lagrange multipliers, we can completely identify the posterior distribution. Moreover, by coupling the different prior default regions with their respective
Lagrange multiplier combinations, we can fairly easy construct practically unlimited default probability measures. The current section aims at presenting the huge variability of the possible CIMDO-derived measures.
Systemic Fragility Measure
Our first measure is the CIMDO-derived probability of at least two entities (sovereigns or banks) defaulting jointly. As this is an unconditional measure, it represents the systemic default potential, hence the general vulnerability to systemic events. In other words, it is an indicator of how fragile the system is to default of its constituents. Therefore, we call this indicator the Systemic Fragility Measure (SFM). In essence, it is a CIMDO-derived alternative to a similar measure by Avesani et al. (2006), the Systemic Risk Indicator, with the latter being based on n-th to default baskets of CDS contracts.
As explained above, the calculation of the various probability measures boils down to integrating over the regions of the posterior distribution, where particular default cases occur. With regard to the SFM, this means that we have to sum up all posterior regions, where at least two entities default. For example, in a 3-dimensional system with entities A, B and C, 4 we need to sum up the following unconditional joint probabilities:
where the "¬" sign indicates that the respective entity does not default.
The remaining subsections introduce probability measures that aim to capture complex scenarios -the effect of the default of a particular entity or subset of entities on the distress risk vulnerability of the remaining institutions in the financial system.
Probability of A Defaulting Given B Defaults
We start with the simplest extension beyond the unconditional joint probability framework: the probability of default of entity A given entity B defaults (P(A|B)).
Deriving P(A|B) is a direct application of the Bayes rule:
where P(A, B) is the joint probability of default of entities A and B, while P(B) is the marginal probability of default of entity B.
Note that in a system with N entities, the calculation of this measure effectively involves decreasing the dimensionality from N to 2 (for the calculation of P(A, B)) and to 1 (for the calculation of P(B)). Both ingredients of the conditional probability 4 could be derived by integrating the multivariate joint density over the remaining N-2 or N-1 entities. Moreover, integration over N-1 entities is in fact equivalent to using the CDS-derived marginal probabilities of default of the N-th entity. Therefore, only the integration over the N-2 entities not involved in the respective conditional probability suffices for the calculation of 4.
Probability of A Defaulting Given B and C Default
The next indicator measures the conditional probability of default of an entity, given two other entities default simultaneously. In the Bayes' framework, mentioned before, this probability of default is defined as
with P(A, B, C) and P(B, C) being respectively the joint probabilities of entities A, B and C, and of entities B and C defaulting.
The procedure for calculation of the measure is similar to the one in the previous subsection, but this time it involves decreasing the N-dimensional joint probability of default to its 3-and 2-dimensional alternatives.
Probability of at Least N-1 Additional Entities Defaulting Given Entity A Defaults
Our final (and most complex) probability measure is the probability of at least N-1 entities (banks or sovereigns) defaulting, given a particular entity defaults. 5 This measure is a generalization of the probability of at least one (PAO) bank defaulting, 6 introduced in Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) and aims at addressing the expected severity of a crisis stemming from a particular entity, hence the rate of contagion penetration in the financial system.
To define the measure, let us consider again a system of three banks, A, B and C. 7 The probability of at least one additional bank defaulting given a particular bank (say C) defaults is then
where P (A|C), P (B|C) and P (A, B|C) are the respective conditional probabilities for all possible default contingencies. Using this intuition, it is easy to proceed one step further -to the probability of at least two banks (in this case A and B)
defaulting given bank C defaults:
5
In the text, we abbreviate the measure related to banks as PNBD and the one related to sovereigns as PNSD.
6 PAO is also sometimes referred to as a probability of spillover effects (PSE). 7 The extension to higher dimensions, although more involving, is straightforward, as long as one keeps account of the default contingencies to be added or subtracted.
Hence, in the limit (i.e. for N-1 additional entities defaulting) the PNBD/PNSD converges to the Conditional Joint Probability of Default (CoJPoD) measure, introduced in Radev (2013).
Data and Estimation Strategy
We recover marginal probabilities of default using CDS premia for contracts with maturities from 1 to 5 years for the period 01.01.2007 and 31. 12 .2011. The probabilities of default bootstrapping procedure that we employ requires as additional inputs refinancing interest rates, which we choose to be the AAA euro area government bond yields for maturities from 1 to 5 years. The CDS spreads and the government bond yields are at daily frequency, which is also the frequency of the resulting probabilities of default. Our analysis covers 10 euro area (EA) sovereigns (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and 15 EA large and complex banking groups (EA LCBG). 8 The bank
groups are chosen such that their individual total asset value is above EUR 200
Billion.
The reasons why we rely on CDS data are, first, because bank and sovereign defaults are a relatively rare events and it is difficult to arrive at meaningful actual default frequencies even for entities at the brink of insolvency. The problem can be circumvented by using CDS-derived expected probabilities of default. This brings 
Empirical Results

Marginal Probability of Default Results
This section presents the results for the individual probabilities of default for our samples of banks and sovereigns.
Individual Bank Results
In figures 
Individual Sovereign Results
The sovereign marginal PoD results are presented in figure 3 . As already ob- Our next sections present the results from our multivariate analysis, based on the individual entities' empirical information.
Systemic Fragility Measure Results
Figures 12 and 13 present the banking and sovereign Systemic Fragility Measures, plotted against major regulatory and systemic events since the beginning of 2007. 9 The results for the 15 LCBGs show a significant increase in the EA banking system fragility since the onset of the subprime crisis. The various rescue packages throughout the period seem to temporarily relieve the default pressure in our banking sample. The joint default risk in our 15-dimensional system oscillates around 5%
for a large part of the sample period, but sharply increases after the bailout request by the Portoguese government in the spring of 2011. The negative investor default risk sentiments continue until the end of the sample and reach its maximum soon after the private sector involvement (PSI) agreement for Greece in October 2011.
We notice that, the market joint default expectations seem to react positively to regulatory intervention announcements, but these effects appear to be of transitory nature.
In Figure 13 , we depict the SFM results for the 10 sovereigns in our sample. 10 We notice that until Lehman Brothers' debacle, markets did not expect that the sub- 
Conditional Probabilities Results
Figures 6 and 7 depict the univariate banking (sovereign) probabilities of default, given a particular bank (sovereign) defaults. We notice very different patterns in the banking measures. Apparently, a distressed bank as Dexia (throughout most of the period) had lower impact on the probability of default perceptions with regard to a safer counterpart (Intesa Sanpaolo or Unicredit) than the effect of a default of the latter counterpart on Dexia. This is intuitive, since if the safer bank in a particular couple actually defaulted, investors would expect that it is more likely for the more riskier to follow suit. The bottom two plots deserve special attention, as they present same-country bank couples: Societe Generale -BNP Paribas (France) and Unicredit -Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy). We notice that the conditional default perceptions of the particular banks narrowly trace each other. However, it appears that the French banks couple is perceived generally as the riskier one throughout the sample period.
Turning to the sovereign couples (figure 7), we notice that investors perceive Turning to perceptions about sovereign default given two states go bankrupt (figure 9), we note that investors expect Spain to react relatively more intensively to a default of Italy and Portugal (second plot from the top) than to a simultaneous default of Greece and Portugal. Nonetheless, both contingencies seem to have a very high overall effect on expectations about a Spanish default. The same holds for the perceptions about Italy defaulting given that Portugal and Spain jointly default (second plot from the bottom). Here we note a significant increase in the expected Italian conditional probability of default since mid-2011. Finally, the last plot in figure 9 shows that the joint default of Italy and Spain seems to have limited effect on the expected probability of default of Germany.
Our last measure, the probability of at least N-1 additional entities defaulting given a particular entity defaults, is presented in figure 10 (for banks) and figure   11 (for sovereigns). As mentioned before, for convenience, we call the measure for banks PNBD and the one for sovereigns PNSD. An additional detail is that, for presentation purposes, each curve in figures 10 and 11 presents the cross-sectional median values of the respective probability. Although we still cannot compare the magnitudes of the probabilities of banks and sovereigns, one could expect that if the dimensions of the system's distribution are higher, there would be a higher likelihood of at least one entity defaulting given another one defaults. Therefore, in general one would expect that the conditional probability values for the 15-dimensional banks distribution would be higher than the corresponding values for the 10-dimensional sovereign distribution.
The results confirm the impression from all our previous measures that the distress in the banking system started already in mid-2007, while we witness a slow build-up of sovereign systemic risk up to the default of Lehman Brothers. A surprising finding is that, at least when medians are compared, the probabilities of default of at least 1, 2 and 3 sovereigns given a particular sovereign defaults are higher than the corresponding PNBD values for most of the second half of the sample period. What can be also noted is that the conditional probability of at least one entity defaulting rises very fast to the unity limit of the probability domain (the unreported maximum values are even closer to 1), making the dynamics of this measure (introduced in Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009 ; and often referred to as the probability of spill-over effects) relatively uninformative. Therefore, we believe that our generalization provides a richer picture of the depth of penetration of default spill-over effects within the financial system.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we outline a panel of robustness checks that examines the sensitivity of our approach to changes in the underlying parameters. For brevity, only the results for marginal PoDs and for the banking and sovereign SFM are presented.
The remaining results are available upon request. The relationship is monotonous -higher recovery rates lead to higher PoDs. The effect is most noticeable in the middle of the sample period and less prominent in 2007 and 2011. These results suggest that changing the recovery rates assumption has a predictable effect on our probability measures and would alter their level, but not their dynamics.
We proceed with an analysis of the Systemic Fragility Measure's sensitivity to different dependence structure assumptions (figures 12 and 13). Figure 12 presents the banking SFM results for both the cases where zero correlation (red) and empirical correlation (blue) is assumed. 11 The measures are juxtaposed to major events during the subprime and the sovereign debt crises. We document that both indicators have similar dynamics throughout the sample period and the SFM with empirical correlation is usually above the one with zero correlation. We observe a steady upward trend in the last five years, since the outbreak of the subprime crisis.
The indicator peaks at 15 % for the correlation case and at 25 % for the zerocorrelation case. The crossing point of both versions of the indicator is surprising, as one would expect that when positive correlation between banks' asset is taken into account, banks would tend to default jointly more frequently. In order to explain this result, we need to realize that high correlation between banks means not only that they would most likely default together, but also that they might jointly survive. At some level of default probability on, this transfer of probability mass to the regions not included in equation 3 leads the correlation SFM having a lower value than the benchmark zero-correlation case.
Similar observations can be made in figure 13 for the case of sovereigns. The usually lower zero-correlation series of the sovereign SFM, compared to the correlation case, cross the latter ones around the European Summit on 21 July 2011.
Apparently, as previously observed in figure 12 , this has been a milestone date both on the banking and the sovereign debt markets.
Our last robustness check concerns the prior distribution assumption, underlying the CIMDO distribution. We recall that the main purpose of the CIMDO approach is to adjust the tails of the prior distribution, such that they represent the market consensus about the unobserved system's asset distribution. The resulting CIMDO distribution is fat-tailed by construction, no matter what the prior distribution is.
This intuition is confirmed when we compare the sovereign SFM results when a normal distribution and a Student-t distribution (5 degrees of freedom) are used as priors. Our CIMDO-derived measures are almost identical. Although the Studentt-based measure is always above the Gaussian-based one, the latter has the same dynamics. Hence, for practical purposes assuming Normal prior distribution might suffice in a CIMDO setting.
12 12 The insensitivity of the CIMDO distribution to changing the prior distribution assumption is analytically shown in Segoviano (2006) .
Conclusion
This paper outlines a procedure for consistent estimation of individual and joint default risk within the euro area financial system. We apply our method to calculate several measures of systemic fragility, first of euro area banks, and then with regard to euro area sovereigns. In addition, we undertake a number of robustness checks with respect to the major parameter assumptions in our methodology.
Our analysis documents that although the fragility of the EA banking system had started to deteriorate before Lehman Brothers' file for bankruptcy, investors did 
